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Migrant Workers and
Fissured Workforces:
CS Wind and the Dilemmas
of Organizing Inter-Company Transfers in Canada 1
Abstract
Canadian temporary foreign worker programs have been proliferating in recent years. While
much attention has deservedly focused on programs that target so-called low skilled workers,
such as seasonal agricultural workers and live-in caregivers, other programs have been
expanding, and have recently been re-organized into the International Mobility Program (IMP).
Streams within the IMP are quite diverse and there are few legal limits on their growth. One of
these, inter-company transfers (ICTs), is not new, but it now extends beyond professional and
managerial workers to more permeable and expansive categories. As a result, unions
increasingly face the prospect of organizing workplaces where ICTs and other migrant workers
are employed alongside permanent employees, raising difficult legal issues and strategic
dilemmas. This article presents a detailed case study one union’s response to this situation.

Keywords: migrant workers; intra-company transfers; labour mobility; trade unions; collective
bargaining

Introduction
The use of temporary foreign (migrant) workers 2 in Canada has been a contentious political topic
for several years, resulting in ongoing rounds of program revision 3 and stimulating a large body
of critical academic research across several disciplines, often done in partnerships with migrant
worker activists. 4 Seasonal agricultural workers, live-in caregivers and domestics, and other
low-skill workers in what since 2014 are labelled the Temporary Foreign Worker Program
(TFWP) have been the focus of this controversy and study. While there are good reasons for this
attention, too narrow a focus on these workers (hereinafter referred to as TFWs) has left
relatively unexamined a second category of migrant workers, in what since 2014 has been
labeled the International Mobility Program (IMP). This is unfortunate because while the TFWP
has been shrinking in size in recent years, the IMP has been rapidly expanding (MertinsKirkwood, 2015; Conference Board of Canada, 2016) and there is a significant likelihood that
the number of IMP workers will continue to increase as Canada enters into new bi- and multilateral trade deals that facilitate this kind of labour mobility (Mertins-Kirkwood, 2016; Curry,
2015).
The IMP consists of a number of different programs, one of which is intra-company transfers
(ICTs). ICTs are workers who have been employed in another country by a firm that also
operates in Canada and who are temporarily transferred to the Canadian operation. This
arrangement intersects with a phenomenon that David Weil (2014) has recently drawn attention
to in his book, The Fissured Workplace. Weil’s book examines the changing structure of
employer organizations and its implications for employment conditions and the enforcement of
labour rights. Essentially, by fissuring Weil refers to the phenomenon of employers shifting the
boundaries of the firm inwards so that it reduces the number of workers who are under its direct
control as employees. Instead, the firm meets its labour requirements by contracting with other
entities through franchising, sub-contracting or extended supply chain arrangements to produce
and sell goods and services under its brand name. The result is that responsibility for employees
is also pushed outwards and diffused between multiple entities, often making it unclear which
one is the legal employer or responsible for the employer’s legal obligations.
Intra-company transfers can be understood to involve fissuring in two dimensions. The first is
the fissuring employer responsibility because of a blurring of the lines of legal responsibility
between the parent firm and the sending and receiving subsidiaries. As this case study
demonstrates, it may be difficult to determine which of these entities is the legal employer. The
other dimension of fissuring is at the level of workforce. By combine in one location workers
with several different immigration statuses and types of employment contracts, produces
organized disorganization that creates difficult collective action problems for workers. These
problems are not unique to workplaces with migrant workers. There is, for example, a
developing literature on the challenges involved in organizing workplaces with permanent and
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temporary help agency (THA) workers (Bartkiw 2012) and native born and immigrant workers
(Bernsten and Lillie, 2016;Foster, 2016; Adler, Tapia and Turner, 2014; Alberti, Holgate and
Tapia, 2013).

The CS Wind story brings these strands together. It involves a Korean parent company, which
transfers production workers from in Vietnamese to its Canadian branch plant, where THA
workers were also present. This was the situation confronting the Ironworkers Union when they
were invited by the permanent Canadian workers to lead an organizing drive in the summer of
2012. The response of the employer, the strategy of the union and the resolution of the legal
issues that arose before the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) are the subject of this paper
and provide a window onto the changing landscape of Canadian labour mobility, its legal
implications and the strategic dilemmas faced by unions.

The Changing Landscape of Migrant Worker Programs in Canada
There is no single migrant worker program in Canada. Rather, since its inception, beginning
with the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program in 1964, different programs have been created to
respond to specific employer demands. In 1973 the government created the Non-Immigrant
Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP), a more general temporary worker program that
required prospective employers to obtain a a Labour Market Opinion (LMO – now called a
Labour Market Impact Assessment (LMIA)) that Canadians are not available for these positions.
Work authorizations tied temporary foreign workers to their particular employers. Within the
NIEAP, separate streams developed, each with their own unique rules, including the Live-In
Caregiver Program in 1981 and the low-skill program in 2002. Separate streams for highly
skilled workers were also created (Fudge and MacPhail, 2009; Macklin 1994; Satzewich 1991).
The number of TFWs grew substantially over the turn of the twenty-first century. In 1995, there
were about 14,000 TFWs in Canada at the end of the year, while in in 2009, the peak year, the
number increased to over 112,000 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2014: Table 1.1;
Yalnizyan, 2015). This explosive growth raised concerns that employers were abusing the
program to displace Canadian workers and/or create downward pressure on wages, particularly
at the low end of the labour market (Gross, 2014). 5 But most importantly, academics and
advocates highlighted the vulnerability of TFWs to exploitation and the unfairness of denying
most of these workers a pathway to permanent residency. The fact that since 2006 the number of
temporary foreign workers in all programs exceeded the number of economic immigrants
(Faraday, 2012: 10-11) only emphasized the point that Canada was moving away from its
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traditional policy of meeting labour market needs through permanent immigration toward a guest
worker regime.
Because of the bad publicity generated by revelations of employer abuse of the TFWP and of
the workers in them, as well as the effects of the recession, the number of TFWs obtaining
permits annually declined from a peak of 128,384 in 2008 to 73,094 in 2015. However, this
decline did not result in fewer annual authorizations for migrant workers. To the contrary, since
2008 the total number of annual signed authorizations has increased from 146,980 to 293,010 in
2014, although there was a decline to 249,765 in 2015 (calculated from Citizenship and
Immigration Canada 2014 & 2015). The growth in migrant workers came from the International
Mobility Programs, which comprise a diverse set of programs that facilitate the ability of nonCanadians to work in Canada without having to obtain a LMIA. In 1995 there were less than
40,000 IMP workers present in Canada at the end of the year while in 2015 the number had
grown to about 250,000 (See Figure 1, below).
300000
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Figure 1.
Presence of TFWs and IMPs, 1995-2015.
Sources: Citizenship and Immigration, Canada
2014 and 2015

Table 1 below, prepared by the Canadian government, summarizes the principal differences
between the two programs.
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Temporary Foreign Worker Program
International Mobility Programs
Objective: Last resort for employers to fill Objective: To advance Canada’s broad
jobs for which qualified Canadians are not economic and cultural national interest
available
• Based on employer demand to fill specific
jobs

• Not based on employer demand

• Unilateral and discretionary

• Based largely on multilateral/bilateral
agreements with other countries (e .g .
NAFTA, GATS)

• Employer must pass Labour Market Impact • No Labour Market Impact Assessment
Assessment (formerly LMO)
required
• Lead department ESDC

• Lead department CIC

• No reciprocity

• Based largely on reciprocity

• Employer-specific work permits (TFWs tied • Generally open permits (participants have
to one employer)
greater mobility)
• Majority are low-skilled (i .e . farm workers) • Majority are high skill / high wage
• Last and limited resort because no
Canadians are available

• Workers & reciprocity are deemed to be in
the national economic and cultural interest

• Main source countries are developing
countries

• Main source countries are highly
developed

Table 1.
Comparison of Current Categories of TFWP and IMP.
Source: Employment and Social Development Canada, 2014: 1.

The IMP program is divided into two principal categories, Agreements and Canadian Interests.
The Agreements category includes workers who are admitted pursuant to free trade (FT) and
other international and federal-provincial agreements while the Canadian Interest category is a
more diverse one which is divided into four sub-categories: significant benefit; reciprocal
employment; competitiveness and public policy and charitable or religious. Intra-company
transfers enter Canada through both branches of the IMP. A large percentage of Agreement
workers enter Canada as ICTs pursuant to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
which covers Canada, the United States and Mexico. The agreement permits U.S. and Mexican
citizens who have been continuously employed for at least a year by an enterprise in their home
country to temporarily transfer to a parent, branch, subsidiary or affiliate of that enterprise in
Canada. They must be seeking employment in the Canadian operation in an executive,
managerial or specialized knowledge capacity (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2014a).
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The maximum duration of the work permit is seven years for an executive or managerial
employee and five years for a specialized knowledge worker. There is no limit on the number of
NAFTA ITCs, and at the end of 2015 there were 23,292 such workers in Canada, the large
majority from the United States. (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2015).
The other group of ICTs enter through the significant benefit sub-category of the Canadian
Interests stream of the IMP. The governing provisions are similar to those applicable to NAFTA
intra-company transfers, but apply more broadly to any person employed by a multinational
company outside of Canada who is seeking to work for the parent, or a subsidiary, branch or
affiliate of that enterprise located in Canada. The intra-company transferee must have been
employed continuously for at least one year in the three year period preceding the application
and be seeking to work in an executive, senior managerial or specialized knowledge capacity in
Canada. Generally, the company must have established a continuing and legitimate presence in
Canada and where specialized knowledge workers are involved the company must ensure that
the work is guided and directed by management at the Canadian operation. Initial work permits
are issued for one year but may be renewed for either seven years (executives and managers) or
five years (specialized knowledge worker). The permits are tied to the employer, an occupation
and a location. At the end of 2015 there were 17,755 IMP ICTs in Canada. The combined
number of ICTs present in Canada was 41,047, or about 16% of all IMP workers, making them
the third largest category after competitiveness and public policy6 (122,823) and reciprocal
employment (61,612) (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2015).
The obvious question is whether the growth in the number of IMP workers generally or ICTs in
particular should be worrisome for those who are concerned about the exploitation of temporary
foreign workers and the impact of fissured workforces for workers’ collective action. Sargeant
and Tucker (2010) developed a multi-layered analysis for understanding the occupational health
and safety vulnerabilities of temporary foreign workers which includes consideration of
migration factors, migrant worker factors and receiving country factors. Without elaborating, the
vulnerability structure of IMP workers is different than that of TFWs. In general, IMP workers
have greater labour market mobility because their work permits are commonly more open,
enabling them to work for any employer, although this is not true for ICTs whose work permits
are tied to their employer and their occupational category. In regard to migrant worker factors,
the majority of IMPs are higher skilled and are more likely to come from other developed
countries than is the case for TFWs (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2014: 15). However,
with regard to ICTs there has been a notable increase in the percentage who are specialized
knowledge workers rather than executive or managerial. A special data run by Statistics Canada
(2017) found the percentage in this group had grown from about 15% in 1996 to 55% in 2016.
Of course, specialized knowledge workers range across a wide number of occupations, some of
whom may be more vulnerable than others. Finally, IMP workers are more likely to be recruited
into positions well above the bottom of the Canadian labour market, unlike many streams of the
5

TFWP. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that in general greater concern for TFWs than for IMPs
is still warranted, notwithstanding that their share of all temporary foreign workers in Canada is
declining. However, the IMP is composed of many streams, which require separate evaluation to
determine whether there are specific groups of workers for whom particular concern is
warranted. 7 A comprehensive examination of the IMP and the vulnerabilities it produces is
outside the scope of this article, but the following case study provides at least for some groups a
“middling” level of concern (Brenda, 2003: 209) is warranted.
The issue of fissured workforces is tied to worker vulnerability insofar as it is vulnerable workers
who most need the protection that collective action can provide. Although the Canadian research
is thin, there is little doubt the presence of a significant number of temporary foreign workers
produce a complex environment for collective worker action. Tucker and Jowett (2014)
examined collective bargaining for TFWs in Canada and found in general there had been limited
success organizing seasonal agricultural workers and workers in the low-skill stream. However,
they also found that when TFWs were hired into workplaces that were already organized some
unions negotiated collective agreement provisions that addressed these workers’ particular needs,
including arrangements that facilitated their path to permanent residence. Foster (2014; also
Foster, Taylor and Khan, 2015) studied the response of Canadian unions to TFWs and identified
three temporally sequential approaches or narrative arcs. The first, beginning 2006 when the
influx of TFWs was rapidly increasing, was reactive and negative, denying there were local
labour shortages and demonizing employers for using TFWs to drive down wages and avoid
unions. The second, beginning in the middle of 2007, shifted its focus onto the vulnerability of
TFWs, their exploitation by employers and the failure of government to monitor and protect.
The third narrative, dating from the 2008 recession, constructed a dual narrative of protecting
Canadian jobs while also being concerned for the plight of TFWs.
There is only one study of union organizing in the context of a workplace that employed both
TFWs and permanent Canadian residents (Foster and Barnetson, 2010) and none that examine
union organizing in a workplace with ICTs. The CS Wind story, therefore, provides a first look
at the complexities that can arise in this situation.

The CS Wind Story
CS Wind Corporation is a global wind tower company…we create the bright future for human
[sic] and nature 8
The CS Wind story is a detailed case study of the attempt by the Iron Workers’ union to organize
the Canadian branch-plant of CS Wind Korea (CSWK) in Windsor, Ontario. The employer of
the Canadian workers, CS Wind Canada (CSWC), fiercely resisted this effort and numerous
legal disputes arose, leading the parties frequently to litigate before the Ontario Labour Relations
Board (OLRB), which oversees Ontario’s collective bargaining law. This resulted in many days
6

of hearings with testimony from employer representatives, union organizers and supporters and
ICTs from CS Wind’s Vietnamese subsidiary (CSWV). The Vietnamese workers became
involved in the litigation not because of any choice of their own, but rather because they were
called as witnesses by CSWC. Their presence in the workplace created a strategic dilemma for
the union and provided the employer with an avenue for trying to defeat the organizing drive.
The story is told sequentially, beginning with the establishment of the Canadian branch plant and
the contractual arrangements that governed the Vietnamese ICTs employment in Canada,
followed by an examination of the decisions made by the union during the organizing drive and
the resolution of the complex legal problems that arose as the employer and union maneuvered to
determine the outcome of the organizing drive.
CSWK is a Korean-based company founded in 1989 as the Choong Sang Corporation. It built its
first wind tower manufacturing plant in 2003 in Vietnam followed by a second facility China in
2006. Its sales of wind towers in North America grew and in 2011 it established CSWC and
built a production facility in Windsor, Ontario, a rust belt border city that has suffered from
severe job losses in manufacturing (Ryan, 2012). CSWC began assembling its labour force in
2011, including ICTs from CSWV, domestic hires and temporary help agency (THA) workers.
With regard to the Vietnamese intra-company transfers, an application for visas and work
permits was filed by CSWC in Ho Chi Minh City in September 2011. The stated reason for each
visa was to provide training to Canadian workers regarding “the interpretation and the
implementation of alternative energy technical fabrication and assembly processes; work flow
and administration processes; and business systems, reporting requirements and customer
interaction” (CS Wind, 2014: para 65). The application also stated that while on assignment in
Canada, the Vietnamese workers would receive a monthly salary paid by CSWV in Vietnamese
currency deposited to accounts in Vietnam, that the Vietnamese workers would continue to
participate in CSWV health and benefit plans and that CSWV would be responsible for the
workers’ expenses, including accommodations and round-trip airfare. Salary levels would be
consistent with Vietnamese salary levels, which ranged from $140 a month at the low end, $175
in the mid-range and up to $421 for one worker at the high end. Income taxes were deducted and
paid in Vietnam, as were union dues which were remitted to the Vietnamese union that
represented them in Vietnam (CS Wind, 2014: para 76). 9
The visa application was successful and work permits were issued. The permit authorized the
workers to work for CS Wind at their stated occupation in the Windsor location. The permit
holders were prohibited from attending any educational institution or taking any academic,
professional or vocational training courses while in Canada. The visas were initially issued for
either five or ten months. Ultimately thirty-one Vietnamese workers were transferred to CSWC
by 2012, when production began, one group arriving in 2011 and another in 2012. CSWC
arranged for them to be housed together, for their transportation to and from work and for
lunches to be provided by a local Vietnamese restaurant. They were also provided with
7

allowances for telephone, personal hygiene, laundry, meals and spending money. In April 2012,
CSWC applied for and received one year extensions for those workers whose permits would be
expiring in the near future. In that application, CSWC stated that the Vietnamese workers would
be paid approximately $25 per hour plus allowances and that CSWV would pay these amounts.
Subsequent permit extensions were sought and obtained (CS Wind, 2014: paras 70, 75 & 79).
The actual terms and conditions of the Vietnamese workers apparently varied from those stated
in the visa applications and was the subject of testimony in the OLRB proceedings. It is apparent
from the testimony that local management actually knew very little about what the Vietnamese
workers were being paid. The clearest evidence of their actual terms of employment came from
the testimony of three Vietnamese workers called by CSWC, Nguyen Van Long, Nguyen Huu
Huong and Dang Van Vinh. Each worker was recruited by CSWV and promised they would be
paid double their Vietnamese salary in Vietnamese currency deposited into a Vietnamese bank
account which their families could access. They participated in CSWV’s social and health
insurance plan and were covered by the collective agreement between the Vietnamese union and
CSWV. The OLRB calculated the actual pay of the Vietnamese workers in November 2012,
which ranged between $950 and $1,600 Canadian a month, plus allowances of about $600 a
month. The OLRB found that the Vietnamese worked long hours, frequently more than 60 hours
in a week, for which they were paid overtime in Vietnam (CS Wind, 2014: paras 80-97).
Including salary and allowances, and assuming a forty hour week, the highest paid workers
earned about $13.00 an hour, slightly more than the minimum wage at the time which was
$10.25. However, once overtime hours are included, it is probable that all the Vietnamese
workers were being paid less than the Ontario minimum wage. 10
The number of THA workers employed in production and janitorial services at CSWC is
unknown. However, according Joel Thibodeau, who started working at CSWC in January 2012
and became a lead organizer, most of those workers were on long-term assignment and hoped to,
and many did, become permanent CSWC workers (Thibodeau Interview, 2016). No evidence
was presented on their terms and conditions of employment. It is also not clear how many
domestic production workers were employed by CSWC by the summer of 2012, but it was
certainly over 200 (CS Wind, 2012b and 2013a). By then the Canadian workers were becoming
increasingly dissatisfied with working conditions. There were weekly meetings with
management, which promised improvements that were not made. Local managers seemed to
lack decision-making authority. The company rejected a proposal to have an employee
committee represent workers, while unhappiness over shift scheduling, differences in wage rates,
and disciplinary practices grew. A number of workers got together, including Thibodeau, and
decided to organize with Ironworkers, Local 721. 11 Thibodeau became an active inside organizer
and worked closely with Lash Ray, then the Ironworker’s chief organizer (Thibodeau and Ray
Interviews, 2016).
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From the outset the workers and the union had to consider who they were going to organize. It
was clear that the THA workers would have to be included since under Ontario law it was very
likely CSWC would be found to be their employer for collective bargaining purposes. The
question of the Vietnamese workers was more complicated, both for practical and for legal
reasons. At a practical level, although the Vietnamese workers worked alongside the domestic
workers and also played a role in training, communication was limited since many of the
Vietnamese workers had poor English language skills. As well, they were socially segregated
and highly sequestered by the company: they lived together; they were transported to and from
work together; had their lunches brought to them by the employer, etc. And last but not least,
some of the domestic workers felt resentment toward the Vietnamese workers, which at one
point manifested itself in an offensive posting on a Facebook page allegedly used for organizing
purposes, which was subsequently removed (CS Wind, 2013: para. 15). Part of the resentment
stemmed from the employer’s claim that they needed the Vietnamese workers because local
workers did not have the specialized knowledge and skill required to perform the work. Not only
did this strike at the workers’ sense of their own abilities, but as time wore on, the claim rang
increasingly hollow and some viewed the Vietnamese workers as low wage competitors taking
jobs that should have gone to unemployed workers in the Windsor area. When these feelings
were overlaid on top of the multiple barriers that inhibited communication between the
Vietnamese and the Canadian workers, building solidarity that would facilitate organizing was
difficult (Thibodeau and Barnes Interviews, 2016). 12 Further, as a legal matter, the Vietnamese
workers had contracts of employment with CSWV, the terms of which were not clear even to
local management. In these circumstances, organizers questioned whether it was legally or
practically possible to include the Vietnamese workers in the bargaining unit and bargain on their
behalf.
Notwithstanding the above, it would be overly simplistic to characterize the response of the
Canadian workers and union organizers as reactive and negative, to use the categories developed
by Foster (2014). Organizers also perceived that the Vietnamese workers were being exploited
and paid significantly less than the Canadians and could benefit from being unionized. As a
result, they made some effort to distribute union literature, previously translated into
Vietnamese for an organizing drive at a different location where Vietnamese immigrants were
employed. Lash Ray reports that organizers attempted to go to the building where the
Vietnamese workers were housed but that they were turned away by a CSWC manager from
Korea. On another occasion he reports an attempt was made to leave the translated literature in
the lunch room but the organizer was reprimanded and the literature was removed. It is
unknown whether any of this literature got into the hands of the Vietnamese workers, but it is
certain that none of them tried to contact or join the union. Organizers suspected that the
Vietnamese workers may also have been fearful that if they became involved with the union they
would be sent home (Thibodeau and Ray Interviews, 2016).
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It is not entirely clear when the decision was made to focus exclusively on the Canadian workers,
but it must have occurred fairly early in the organizing drive and was based on strategic
considerations. Because none of the Vietnamese workers had joined the union, their inclusion in
the proposed bargaining unit would have made it more difficult to reach the 40% threshold level
of support necessary to trigger a certification vote. Moreover, even if the union passed the
threshold, winning the election would have been more difficult since it was assumed that the
Vietnamese workers might be mobilized by the employer to vote against the union. And finally,
even if the union won the certification election for a more comprehensive unit, negotiating an
agreement that addressed the concerns and interests of the Vietnamese workers, who were
working pursuant to Vietnamese employment contracts and in Canada without a secure status,
would have presented serious practical problems.
The organizing drive among the Canadian workers quickly gained momentum and the union
filed a certification application on October 4, 2012. The proposed bargaining unit excluded
“training personnel” which clearly referred to the Vietnamese workers. The employer responded
to the application with three lines of attack. The first two were quite conventional. First, it
alleged the union under- estimated of the number of employees in its proposed bargaining unit
and therefore failed to reach the 40% membership threshold necessary to get a certification vote.
Second, it challenged the union’s proposed bargaining unit as not appropriate for collective
bargaining because it excluded the Vietnamese ICT workers and others. The employer’s third
objection, however, was very unusual. It alleged that the exclusion of the Vietnamese workers
was discriminatory and in violation of the province’s Human Rights Code (1990). While
normally human rights claims are adjudicated before the Human Rights Tribunal, the Labour
Relations Act (1995) provides that if a union discriminates on a prohibited ground it cannot be
certified as a bargaining agent to represent workers. The allegation therefore was of great
concern to the union, not just because it offended their perception of themselves as fighters for
social justice, but also because it would have been fatal to their certification application (CS
Wind, 2012). The employer’s claim, however, was not without its own ironies. After all, it was
the employer that sequestered the Vietnamese workers and paid them lower wages for doing
work that was supposedly more skilled than the work performed by the domestic employees.
This was the beginning of the litigation mash-up that produced some very strange and upside
down arguments.
The union was concerned about whether it had properly estimated the number of employees in
its proposed bargaining unit and withdrew its application in order to give it time to recruit more
members (CS Wind, 2012a). The employer’s response also caused the union to rethink its
approach to the Vietnamese workers. It prepared and translated into Vietnamese another
document, “Your Rights in Canada” (Appendix A) which it attempted to distribute to the
Vietnamese workers. The document advised the Vietnamese workers that they had the right to
equal treatment without prejudice, to join a union, to be paid the same as someone doing the
10

same work and to not perform unsafe work. It also offered the union’s assistance in addressing
rights violations or negotiating better terms and conditions of employment. The penultimate
paragraph responded directly to the employer’s allegation that the union discriminated:
CS Wind says we discriminate against the Vietnamese workers and that is not true. We
wish for you to have what all members of the union have, good wages, benefits and a safe
place to work.
The brochure concluded advising the Vietnamese workers that could call the Ironworkers in
confidence and that a Vietnamese speaker would call them back.
It was also around this time that the union considered organizing the Vietnamese workers as a
separate bargaining unit and distributed a third document, also translated into Vietnamese,
headed “Warmest Welcome.” The union advised the Vietnamese workers it wished to represent
the interests of all workers at CS Wind and understood that the Vietnamese workers needed a
union “even more than other workers at the CS Plant” because of their inability to work
elsewhere:
The IRONWORKERS UNION know that workers from Vietnam have unique concerns
and think Vietnamese workers should have their own union bargaining unit and union so
that you are able to get your employer to address the workplace problems shared by
workers transferred from Vietnam…
The only way the problems faced by Vietnamese workers transferred to Canada will get
better is if you join together to form a union to demand change.
The Vietnamese workers were given the name of a Vietnamese member of the Ironworkers
working for a different employer in the Windsor area who they could contact. It is unclear how
much effort the union devoted to getting this literature into the hands of the Vietnamese workers
and, given the difficulties identified previously, it is unlikely it reached them. In any event, no
Vietnamese workers contacted the union.
On November 19, 2012 the union filed another certification application for a proposed
bargaining unit that excluded “persons working pursuant to an intra-company transfer program
and/or employees of CS Wind Vietnam.” The employer responded to this application as it had to
the first. The board deferred consideration of the employer’s objections and ordered that an
election be held on November 26. It defined the voting constituency broadly to permit all
production employees to vote save and except persons above the rank of foreman. Disputed
ballots were to be segregated and the ballot box would be sealed until the outstanding issues had
been resolved (CS Wind 2012b).
11

Before the certification election, the employer held a meeting with employees on a Sunday,
which workers were paid to attend. At that meeting, Joel Thibodeau asked why the Vietnamese
workers were being paid lower wages and were having their terms and conditions of employment
dictated to them. CSWC’s legal counsel, David McNevin’s lengthy response castigated the
union for seeking to carve the Vietnamese workers out of the bargaining unit (CS Wind, 2015:
para 72). 13 In the certification election 187 ballots were cast, of which 60 were segregated
pending the outcome of various challenges.
Much litigation followed, including allegations of unfair labour practices leading up to and
following the vote and of occupational health and safety reprisals (eg., CS Wind, 2013a & 2015).
These aspects of the case are not examined since they did not touch on the question of the
Vietnamese ICTs. There was, however, the employer’s allegation that the union had unlawfully
discriminated against the Vietnamese workers and therefore had disqualified itself from being
certified. The union challenged the employer’s standing to bring the claim and challenged
whether a prima facie case had been made out. In response, the employer alleged that a
Facebook page used in the original organizing drive contained offensive comments about the
Vietnamese workers and claimed that the union had made minimal efforts to translate its
organizing materials during the membership drive that resumed after the first application was
withdrawn. These claims were additional to the assertion that the exclusion of the Vietnamese
workers from the proposed bargaining unit was itself discriminatory.
The board ruled that the Facebook allegation was too vague since it failed to identify the
impugned comments or who had made them, but the Board did allow the employer to introduce
evidence regarding the translation of written material and the bargaining unit description.
However, the employer ultimately chose not pursue its human rights claim, leaving the position
of the Vietnamese workers to be addressed on the basis of whether the union’s proposed unit was
appropriate for collective bargaining (CS Wind, 2013).
Given the large number of issues before the OLRB, it needed to decide on the order in which
they would be considered and chose to start with the bargaining unit issue. A little labour law
background is essential here. Ontario labour law requires a union applying for certification to
define of the group of employees it wishes to represent. However, the labour board must find the
union’s proposed bargaining unit to be an appropriate one and the employer is given the
opportunity to challenge the unit proposed by the union and suggest a different one. In recent
years the OLRB has taken the view that the bargaining unit proposed by the union does not have
to be the most appropriate one, based on some notion of what an ideal unit would be, but rather
that the employees share a community of interest and that the unit that will not cause the
employer significant industrial relations problems. However, there is a background condition
that must be satisfied and that is that all members of the bargaining unit must be employed by the
12

employer (Adams, 2017: 7.2). As a result, it had to be determined who was the employer of the
Vietnamese workers for collective bargaining purposes, CSWC or CSWV. 14
In many contexts, it is the named employer who argues it is not the legal employer in order to
avoid the ensuing obligations. Here, however, the situation was reversed; CSWC was arguing
that it was the legal employer of the Vietnamese workers, while the union was arguing that it was
not and that they were employed by CSWV. As is often the case in litigation, these positions
were taken for purely strategic purposes. For the CSWC, a finding that it was the employer was
essential in order for it to be able to argue that the Vietnamese ITCs must be included in the
bargaining unit, while for the union a finding that CSWV was the employer would preclude the
Vietnamese workers from being in the bargaining unit. The downside of the union’s position,
however, was that if their argument succeeded the Vietnamese workers could not be certified as
a separate bargaining unit either, although that was a remote prospect in any event.
Ontario uses a “comprehensive” test to determine the ‘true’ employer for the purposes of
collective bargaining. The Supreme Court of Canada devised this test in the context of a case
involving THA workers, where the question was whether the agency or the client was the
employer for the purposes of collective bargaining (Pointe Claire 1997, para. 48).
According to this more comprehensive approach, the legal subordination and integration
into the business criteria should not be used as exclusive criteria for identifying the real
employer. In my view, in a context of collective bargaining…it is essential that
temporary employees be able to bargain with the party that exercises the greatest control
over all aspects of their work – and not only over the supervision of their day to day
work….Without drawing up an exhaustive list of factors pertaining to the employeremployee relationship, I shall mention the following examples: the selection process,
hiring, training, discipline, evaluation, supervision, assignment of duties, remuneration
and integration into the business.
The OLRB reviewed the evidence in relation to these factors and found that the Vietnamese
workers were hired and trained by CSWV and indeed had relatively long service with CSWV,
some having previously worked stints at CS Wind’s Chinese branch plant. The decision to send
them to work at the Windsor branch plant was made by the head office in Korea, but the
Vietnamese workers had been asked to go to Canada by their Vietnamese supervisors. The terms
and conditions of their employment were made in Vietnam, including a retention bonus for each
month they worked in Canada, as well as higher rates of pay. There was no evidence that CSWC
had any role in setting their terms and conditions of employment. Indeed, local managers did not
know the terms of the Vietnamese workers’ contracts, even regarding what constituted regular
hours of work or overtime, and their hours of work were separately recorded by a different
system than the one used for the domestic workers. In terms of work, the OLRB found that the
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Vietnamese workers were doing the same work as the domestic workers, with the same tools and
equipment, and reporting to the same supervisors and managers. They also generally worked in
teams with the domestic workers.
Given this fissured responsibility structure, who exercised the greatest control over all aspects of
the work? The answer is far from obvious, but the OLRB had to decide and it determined it was
CSWC. The OLRB explained its conclusion in a brief paragraph (CS Wind, 2014: para 111).
It is CSWC which arranged their accommodation; their transportation to and from the
plant; had meals delivered to the plant for them; paid them various cash allowances;
directed their schedules and work; has made all arrangements for the extension of their
work permits; and it seems that it will be CSWC which will ultimately determine when
they can return to Vietnam. It is noteworthy that two of conditions of the work permits
are that the Vietnamese Workers must continue to work for CSWC and at the Windsor
plant.
Notwithstanding this conclusion, later in its judgment the OLRB emphasized the significance of
the fact that these workers’ terms and conditions of employment were set in Vietnam for the
purposes of collective bargaining (CS Wind, 2014: paras138-39).
Even though, for the purposes of this application, the Board has found that CSWV is not
the employer of the Vietnamese Workers, the practical reality appears to be that CSWV
plays a major role in their terms and conditions of employment. However, the Union
would not have that company at the bargaining table and have no legal means of getting it
to participate in negotiations.
Even if the Union is able to conclude a collective agreement for a bargaining unit that
included both types of workers, it argued that it would have no practical means of
enforcing wage payments of health insurance benefits in Vietnam. If a Vietnamese
worker was disciplined or terminated from employment and therefore returned to
Vietnam with the consequent loss of a work permit, the Union would have no way to get
the worker back to Canada for grievance arbitration, or in the event of a reinstatement,
would not be able to enforce the remedy.
In any event, based on its finding that CSWC was the true employer, the board then turned its
mind to question of a bargaining unit that excluded the Vietnamese workers was an appropriate
one. The employer’s claim that such a bargaining unit unlawfully discriminated on the basis of
ethnic origin had been dropped by this point, so the matter was addressed from a conventional
industrial relations perspective, which focuses on whether the employees share a sufficient
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community of interest and whether the proposed unit would cause the employer serious
industrial relations problems (Hospital for Sick Kids, 1985).
Ironically, the employer argued that the two groups shared a community of interest because the
Vietnamese and domestic workers performed the same work and had the same skill set, even
though the Vietnamese workers were more highly skilled because of their greater work
experience. This position was accepted by the board, notwithstanding that it was somewhat at
odds with the employer’s justification for the work permits -- that the Vietnamese workers were
needed to train Canadian workers who lacked the skill to perform the job. However, the board
ultimately concluded there was no community of interest between the domestic and the
Vietnamese workers because of the differences in the levels and types of compensation and
allowances and because the Vietnamese workers were only in Canada temporarily. “As such
their expectations or interests are perforce going to be quite different from those of domestic
workers who have long-term employment interests” (CS Wind, 2014: para 123).
The board was also sympathetic to the union’s claim that it would be hard-pressed to meet its
duty of fair representation to the 31 Vietnamese workers and the approximately 160 domestic
workers (CS Wind, 2014: para 124 & 128).
The union would have no real way of addressing the fact that the majority of the
bargaining unit would not share the same interests or terms and conditions of
employment. The Board has to be mindful of a union’s ability to bargain for a viable unit
and it is understandable that the competing interests of these two groups go well beyond
the usual issues between groups of workers.
If the Vietnamese Workers are included in the bargaining unit, it will be difficult for the
Union to bargain for this balkanized group in light of their different terms and conditions
of employment and security of tenure with the employer.
With regard to the question of whether excluding the Vietnamese workers from the bargaining
unit would generate serious labour relations problems for the employer, the Board was cognizant
that the employer had structured the workforce as it had for its own purposes (CS Wind, 2014:
para127).
…CSWC has apparently structured the workplace to meet its production needs, and has
availed itself of the Temporary Foreign Worker program to bring 31 Vietnamese Workers
to Windsor to both train and to supplement its domestic workforce until the domestic
workers have been trained to the employer’s satisfaction. As such, it has organized the
workplace as it finds administratively convenient for its production purposes….CSWC
has thus created a fractured workforce in which there are a large number of permanent
15

domestic workers, and a smaller, but not insignificant number of temporary foreign
workers, all of whom are doing essentially the same work.
In short, it found that the employer “has structured its workforce with the very division which it
wishes the Board to ignore.” To emphasize the point, the OLRB noted that while the federal
government’s immigration policy mandated that intra-company transfers did not have the same
labour market or job mobility as Canadian workers, it had been the choice of CS Wind to provide
the Vietnamese workers with different terms and conditions of employment than its other
production workers (CS Wind, 2014: para 132 &138).
Finally, perhaps to address the earlier allegations made by the employer that the union had
unlawfully discriminated against the Vietnamese workers by excluding them from the proposed
bargaining unit, the OLRB explicitly stated that the basis for its determination that the union’s
proposed unit was appropriate was the large difference in the circumstances of the two groups of
workers and the difficulties this would cause the union, and not because of the Vietnamese
workers’ national origin or immigration status (CS Wind, 2014: para 146).
While this is the end of the story for our purposes, the decision in this case did not resolve the
certification application, but merely allowed the ballots to be counted and defined the bargaining
unit for which the union needed to demonstrate majority support. The union lost the election but
had earlier filed unfair labour practice complaints alleging that the employer had engaged in
unlawful actions that prevented the employees from expressing their true wishes. After lengthy
hearings, the OLRB upheld the union’s complaint and determined that a remedial certification
was the appropriate remedy in the circumstances (CS Wind, 2015; Thompson, 2015). Early in
2016 the union and the employer reached a first collective agreement (Battagello, 2016). By
then, the Vietnamese intra-company transfer workers were gone, so even if they had been
included in the bargaining unit, they would not have benefited from the collective agreement.

Conclusion and Reflections
The rapid growth in the use of migrant workers in Canada attracted much critical attention,
largely focused on the TFWP and particularly its lower-skilled streams. However, as this article
demonstrates, an overly narrow focus on these particularly vulnerable workers may leave
unexamined new and growing streams of migrant workers under the International Mobility
Program. While this program is quite diverse, researchers need to more carefully assess
particular sub-groups and, where appropriate, make visible their labour market vulnerabilities.
As well, and particularly for vulnerable migrant workers, it is important to consider the
implications of and responses to workplace and workforce fissuring for both migrant and nonmigrant workers.
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Intra-company transfers are not a new form of labour mobility in Canada, but until fairly recently
the number of workers involved was relatively small and most were professionals and
executives. The rapid growth in the number of ICTs through both the Agreements and the
Canadian Interests branches of IMP and the possibility of continued expansion, is good reason to
scrutinize this stream more closely. While the program is currently restricted to workers in high
skill categories, its boundaries are permeable and the situation that arose at CS Wind could
become more common, although that will be determined by the response of the federal
government to political pressure.
On the one hand, the Canadian government was responsive to concerns about the potential to
exploit the specialized knowledge worker category to transfer lower skilled workers as ICTs.
As a result, it introduced more rigorous assessment criteria for determining who qualified under
this heading. This included a requirement that applicants establish on a balance of probabilities
that the worker possesses a high standard of specialized knowledge, including both company
specific and advanced expertise. As well, at least for non-NAFTA ICTs, the government states it
will examine the wage currently being paid, expecting to see an above average salary that
reflects the worker’s specialized knowledge (Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2014c). This
may have contributed to a decline in the number of ICTs entering Canada since its peak in 2013,
including a reduction in the number of specialized knowledge workers (Statistics Canada, 2017).
On the other hand, future trade agreements could open up the categories of workers permitted to
enter as ICTs or in other IMP categories. For example, while the main text of the TPP contains
fairly general language about temporary entry for business people, including ICTs, Canada’s
schedule of specific country commitments in Annex 12-A is quite expansive. In addition to
investors, business visitors and ICTs (including a broadly defined sub-category of specialists),
Canada also agrees to admit on a temporary basis listed “professionals and technicians” on a
party by party basis. The definitions for these groups include workers engaged in occupations
that have a National Occupational Classification skill level of O (Managerial), A (Professional)
or B (Technical). The inclusion of workers with skill level B expands upon previous trade
agreements which were limited to workers from skill levels O and A, 15 and includes a wide
range of listed occupations, such as contractors and tradespeople in various fields. Moreover,
these workers are not ICTs who must have been employed by a subsidiary or parent, but may be
hired by any Canadian company (Mertins-Kirkwood, 2016; Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement, 2016: Annex 12-A). Although the future of the TPP is now in doubt, even if it does
not come into force it could provide a template for future bi-lateral or multi-lateral trade
agreements governing labour mobility.
The article also makes visible the legal and strategic difficulties unions face when attempting to
organize workplaces with migrant workers generally and intra-company transfers in particular.
As noted, the legal arguments in CS Wind were upside down: CSWC initially alleged that the
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union was unlawfully discriminating against the Vietnamese workers, when it was the party
directly and most obviously responsible for the differential treatment; that it was the legal
employer when it is far more common for companies to argue they are not the legal employer in
order to avoid the legal responsibility for workers; and that a more inclusive bargaining unit
should be required when its underlying goal was union avoidance, not more effective and
efficient collective bargaining. The union’s arguments were also upside down. Its claim that the
Vietnamese workers’ legal employer was CSWV would have deprived these workers of the
benefit of much of Ontario’s protective labour and employment laws and the argument that
temporary foreign workers could be excluded from the bargaining unit impeded their access to
unionization, undermining the broad worker solidarity on which industrial union strength is
based.
Of course, these legal positions were primarily driven by short-term tactical considerations: the
employer wanted to prevent its production workforce from unionizing; the union wanted to
improve its odds of organizing a new bargaining unit. While the situation did not present a
strategic dilemma for the employer, who was singularly interested in union avoidance, it posed a
difficult dilemma for the union, which is not easily resolved. On the one hand, the union has an
interest in organizing bargaining units that it can get certified by winning majority support. To
achieve that goal, the union may seek to exclude groups of workers that it finds particularly
difficult to reach or convince of the merits of unionization or who the majority of employees may
resent. On the other hand, unions should be and often are quite concerned about the exploitation
of vulnerable workers generally and of migrant workers in particular. How can and should
unions respond when the achievement of their shorter-term organizing objectives conflict with
their longer-term interest in building inclusive solidarity?
To a significant extent, these strategic dilemmas are produced by the underlying structures of
collective bargaining regimes. The function of trade unions in North American collective
bargaining regimes is narrowly representational as opposed to regulatory (Ewing 2005). As a
result, to gain representational rights unions must organize enterprise or sub-enterprise
bargaining units . This arrangement requires them to make a strategic decision about which
workers can be successfully organized, and thus arises the problem of whether to include TFWs
who may be more difficult to recruit. But, as well, they also need to make some legal judgments.
First, they need correctly to identify the employer of the workers they wish to organize, taking
into account that in a fissured workforce, not all employees will have the same employer.
Second, because North American regimes do not permit unions unilaterally to determine the
group of workers they wish to represent, unions must also make a legal assessment of whether
their preferred group ey choose will constitute an appropriate bargaining unit in the eyes of a
labour board that is also required to consider the employer’s interests.
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To date, Canadian labour boards have only dealt with a small number of cases involving
temporary foreign workers and CS Wind is the first instance in which it had to consider the
specific situation of ICTs. Most of its previous judgments have involved seasonal agricultural
workers (Tucker and Jowett, 2014). With regard to the question of the legal employer, labour
boards have rejected arguments by farm owners that they are not the employer of SAWs because
many terms and conditions of their employment are established by the inter-governmental
agreements.
With regard to appropriate bargaining units, the issue has rarely arisen, in part because most
certification applications have been for units comprised entirely of SAWs, and farmers have
rarely argued that the proposed unit is inappropriate because it failed to include their Canadian
employees, where such workers are present. In the one case an employer did make that
argument the board rejected it on the basis that the terms and conditions of the SAWs were
sufficiently distinct to justify separate certification (Sidhu, 2010). 16 The bargaining unit issue
also became contentious in Quebec when its collective bargaining law only allowed agricultural
workers to organize if the employer hired at least three year-round employees. Under this
regime, the labour board approved both separate and combined bargaining units. 17
The emerging legal framework points to likelihood that Canadian firms using temporary foreign
workers, including intra-company transfers, will be found to be their employers, but unions will
be able to choose whether or not to include temporary foreign workers, including intra-company
transfers, in the bargaining units they attempt to organize since either configuration is likely to be
found appropriate. Thus, while the structure of the law creates strategic dilemmas, it does not
resolve them one way or another. Unions must still decide how to proceed.
Of course, in principle unions should seek inclusive bargaining units. This would give
temporary foreign workers terms and conditions of employment comparable to those of domestic
workers, including protection against unjust discipline and discharge for the duration of their
work permits. As well, unions then have the opportunity to negotiate contract provisions to
address some specific vulnerabilities resulting from these workers’ precarious immigration
status. For example, special remedies, such as liquidated damages, could be negotiated to deter
employers from wrongfully repatriating workers or to properly compensate those who are.
But it is not enough to espouse principles if the obstacles that stand in the way of their realization
are formidable and very unlikely to be overcome. The Ironworkers clearly faced a very tough
situation: the Vietnamese workers were difficult to reach because of language, cultural and
employer-created barriers; their temporary status reduced the potential benefits of unionization
while increasing the their vulnerability to employer retaliation; and Canadian worker support for
their inclusion could not be taken for granted. Moreover, even if the union had succeeded in
organizing an inclusive bargaining unit it is not obvious that it would have been able to negotiate
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more favourable arrangements for the Vietnamese workers without putting their continued
employment in Canada at risk.
Finally, there is the question of the preferences of the Vietnamese workers. They had returned to
Vietnam by the time this research was conducted and so there was no opportunity for them to be
interviewed. There is also little we can infer from the fact that they never responded to the
union’s outreach efforts. Did they have no interest in being a part of the union; did they not feel
welcomed; or did they fear employer retaliation? Three Vietnamese workers were called by
CSWC to testify before the OLRB about their recruitment in Vietnam, the terms of the
Vietnamese contracts they signed terms and the work they performed in Ontario, but they were
not, and could not have been, asked about their attitude toward unionization and in any event this
was hardly a setting in which they could have expressed their ‘true’ wishes.
So what is to be done? There are no easy answers within the parameters of the North American
system of enterprise certifications and collective bargaining. In principle, these strategic
dilemmas could be reduced in a labour law regime that assigned unions a regulatory role,
establishing terms and conditions at a sectoral level that benefit all workers employed in the
sector. In such a regime, unions would not have to organize bargaining units taking into account
whether a particular group of workers was organisable while correctly identifying the employer
and properly assessing whether their chosen bargaining unit would be found to be appropriate.
However, regulatory bargaining systems that exist solely at a national scale may not resolve the
problem if the law permits the migrant worker to remain classified as the employee of their home
employer. In this situation, the ICT would remain outside the sectoral agreement, resulting in
labour market vulnerability and producing fissured workforces. This is the problem that
confronted European Union (EU) members and led to the 1996 Posted Workers Directive. The
Directive contemplates that posted workers will remain the employees of the sending company
and so are subject to the sending countries laws. However, to avoid social dumping, the Directive
provides that posted workers are entitled to a set of core rights in the host Member state
including minimum wages and maximum hours of work laws, among others (Posted Workers
Directive, 1996). Controversial interpretations of the Posted Workers Directive have reduced
this floor of rights but recently a reform measure was presented by the European Commission
that would entitle posted workers to equal pay and working conditions as local workers
(European Commission, 2016). The Directive does much less to protect collective bargaining
rights. Indeed, the European Court of Justice infamously held that collective bargaining
agreements are a potential barrier to trade so that unions are severely limited in the actions they
can take to enforce their terms in regard to posted workers (Davies, 2008). Moreover, to the
extent that enterprise bargaining displaces sectoral bargaining, the Directive does not adequately
deal with the situation of posted workers who are inserted into a non-union setting and how their
presence might affect the acquisition of bargaining rights.
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In sum, while many ICTs are high level executives and managers for whom their temporary
transfer is a stepping stone to advancement, the boundaries of this migrant worker are permeable
and liable to expand to include lower skilled and vulnerable workers. When this occurs, as in the
case of CS Wind, the result is fissured employers and fragmented workforces. In this context, it
is a challenge to insure that ICTs and other migrant workers receive adequate social protection
and have access to effective collective representation. Labour clauses in trade agreements are
unlikely to provide much protection (Tham and Ewing 2016). The application of local
employment law to ICTs and other TFWs goes some distance towards meeting these goals,
however, where collective bargaining regimes assign unions a representational function, and
unions must gain representation rights at the enterprise level they face strategic dilemmas over
the incorporation of temporary foreign workers into bargaining units. These dilemmas are
reduced where unions exercise a regulatory function, but unless the condition of ICTs and other
migrant workers is effectively addressed at a transnational scale, the problems of fissuring and
fragmentation are likely to recur.
Legal arrangements are thus responsible for the structures that produce strategic dilemmas and
unions must grapple with the hand they have been dealt. The outline of a principled approach is
clear: inclusive organizing and bargaining should be the union’s goal, but conditions on the
ground, may limit what can be achieved, even when unions make a serious effort to involve ICTs
and other migrant workers. This case study epitomizes the strategic dilemmas that the Canadian
collective bargaining regime creates, but, dare I say, the answers to those dilemmas are not
blowing in CS Wind.
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1 This paper is written with the support of the On the Move Partnership, which is a project of
the SafetyNet Center for Occupational Health and Safety Research at Memorial University. It is
supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council through its Partnership
Grants funding opportunity, the Research and Development Corporation of Newfoundland and
Labrador, the Canada Foundation for Innovation and multiple universities and community
partners across Canada and elsewhere. Thanks to Mary Hurley for her research assistance, Alec
Stromdahl for his editorial assistance and Jason Foster for comments on an earlier draft.
2 A note on terminology is required. Migrant worker is a broad category that is variously used to
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regime for making collective representations for workers in this situation (Tucker and Jowett,
2014: 47-48).
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